Leaving Bosnia

Germany's former postal service minister, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, took over as the international community's High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on Jan. 31, 2006. He hands over his post to Slovakia's Miroslav Lajcak on July 1, 2007.

DW-WORLD.DE: As the high representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, you have been overseeing the Dayton Agreement since Jan. 31, 2006. You can remove politicians from office and revise laws. But critics have accused you of political weakness. Why didn't you make use of your powers, such as your predecessor Paddy Ashdown, who removed some 60 Bosnian dignitaries from office?

Christian Schwarz-Schilling: When I took over this mandate, the entire international community called on me to give the Bosnians more individual responsibility. We wanted to leave the country at the beginning of 2007. But how can you pull out when the people have never learned to take on their own responsibilities?

It's true that I didn't lay anyone off because I don't consider that an effective method. And the heads grow back like a Hydra. I carried out institutional changes through legal amendments or implemented tax allocation. I did a great deal that just didn't have a very high publicity effect.

I continue to stand by this. The Bosnians had to recognize that personal responsibility isn't easy and the international community had to learn what the reality is here. Everyone thought everything was fine and that the formulas for compromise from above, which hadn't even properly arrived at the bottom, were now functioning. They didn't even see that they only function because the high representative enforces them with his power.

Ten years ago, the Dayton Agreement divided the country into two entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The good intention of the international community was behind this, which was paraphrased as "three peoples, two entities, one nation." But was it also the cornerstone for a viable country named Bosnia and Herzegovina?

No, Dayton was only the ending of the genocide and the war between the individual parts of the former Yugoslavia. The reorganization at the time, which only regulated the international administration, was never a true constitution, as there were various constitutions on the level of the entities as well as on the state level. But Dayton wasn't created for that purpose. Rather, it was supposed to be the beginning. It created the possibility for improvements. But they could only proceed sluggishly as the consensus of all three states was necessary.

Does this construction make sense or should this cooperation be questioned in principle?

The concept was ailing from the beginning, as many in the international community thought that this Dayton Agreement could create a modern nation. The decisive error was that the entities had very different functions, drifted apart and the national level was developed far too weakly. For me, a sustainable country is not feasible without a decisive constitutional reform. It has to bring these various levels together, bringing about a meaningful form of government and, also in this sense, then compatible for the corresponding substructures, i.e. the entities.

You often criticized those politicians "driven by personal ambition" who were trying to shatter the constitutional legal framework and territorial order of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Are you surrendering?

No, not at all. I would have gladly been prepared to continue my work under certain conditions. But the international community was of the opinion that a political change could push things forward. Unfortunately, the German EU presidency didn't campaign very strongly. But I really would have liked to have carried on.

When you look back at your time in office: what is at the top of the list in your personal performance?

We pushed forward a lot of things. But the most important thing is that the truth became a bit more visible: that Bosnia is not in a position to carry responsibility on its own to the degree that we can close the Office of the High Representative. Either the high representative has to stay on for one or several years, in order to effectively lead the country to taking personal responsibility, or Europe has to take on this role from the international community and see to the security here. But Europe is not willing to do this at the moment; or rather Europe believes that Bosnia is a completely normal country where you just have to wait until it's ready.

That is an error. Bosnia had a unique fate -- with genocide, refugees and many dead -- like in no other European country after World War II. For this reason, we can't say: we'll treat Bosnia like any other country. That wasn't done with Germany, either. We didn't learn democracy and free government in five years, either.

What advice do you have for your successor, Slovakia's Miroslav Lajcak?

I would advise him to consider the situation of this country in his decisions with consistency, but also with great understanding. And he should make it clear to Europe from the beginning that the decision to close the office next year should be tied to certain conditions. These should be formulated now and not shortly before.

Ina Rottscheidt interviewed Christian Schwarz-Schilling (sac)