2014: A year of anxiety

The nationwide survey, published by The Asia Foundation on Tuesday, November 18, shows that while 54.7 percent of Afghans feel the South Asian nation is moving in the right direction - down from 57.2 percent in 2013 - 40.4 percent feel the opposite way - up from 37.9 percent in 2013 - the largest percentage measured since the Afghan polling began ten years ago.

Conducted between June 22 and July 8 and titled Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People, the public opinion poll cites insecurity (38 percent), alongside corruption (24 percent), unemployment (22 percent), a bad economy (10 percent), and election fraud (9 percent) as the main reasons for the increase in pessimism.

The findings come at a critical time for the conflict-ridden country as foreign combat troops prepare to leave in the coming weeks and government forces face an increasingly resilient insurgency. Moreover, many fear the new national unity government, inaugurated late September, may be paralyzed by internal power struggles between those supporting President Ashraf Ghani and those backing chief executive officer Abdullah Abdullah.

Scott Smith, director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia program at the United States Institute of Peace, says in a DW interview that despite the rise in anxiety in 2014, there are very good reasons for optimism under President Ghani, who has spent his first two months acting decisively on a clear reform agenda. The new president, however, still has to face the issue of power-sharing, and the dilemmas it poses, he adds.

DW: Why do Afghans seem increasingly pessimistic?

Scott Smith: 2014 was a year of great anxiety for Afghans. Two major events took place that would strip away much of what had been familiar and predictable over the past decade. The first event was the withdrawal of all international combat troops. While sometimes problematic in the tactics they used, these troops represented the international community's commitment to the security of Afghanistan.

The second event was the presidential election, in which President Hamid Karzai, the face of Afghan politics since 2001, was constitutionally prevented from contesting a third term. Afghans were well aware that a peaceful and democratic transition had never taken place in their history.

Many feared that President Karzai might find a way to hold onto power, or that the elections might degenerate into violence. The survey itself was conducted in June, after the run-off election between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, and at a moment when the process itself was becoming increasingly contentious and polarizing.

All of these factors contributed to an understandable sense of anxiety, which helps explain the growing pessimism revealed in the survey. At the same time, the analysis in the survey provides some interesting details. First, in the east and west of the country, the number of people saying that the country was going in the right direction increased compared to previous years. In fact, pessimism and optimism varied greatly between regions, between urban and rural areas, and between men and women.

How would you describe the present state of the Afghan Nation Security Forces (ANSF) and their ability to fight the Taliban?

Responsibility for security across the national territory was transferred to Afghan national security forces in June of 2013. These forces have therefore been in the lead through the last two fighting seasons. The summer of 2014 was particularly challenging because the security forces had to both maintain pressure on the insurgency and protect the presidential elections. Most experts agree that the Afghan forces performed remarkably well under difficult conditions.

However, beneath this generally positive story are four causes for worry. First, the ANSF successes were achieved at the cost of a high and unsustainable level of casualties. It is unclear whether they can endure another fighting season next year with the same level of casualties.

Second, up to now international forces have provided critical support functions to Afghans, such as intelligence, medevac, and air cover. As international troops withdraw, this support is being reduced, and the burdens placed on Afghan forces are increasing. For example, the higher number of casualties is probably in part the consequence of reduced medevac capability.

Third, the decision by the US administration to reduce its troop level this year to 9,800 (from a peak of around 100,000 several years ago), and to virtually none by the end of 2016, might lower morale among Afghan forces, particularly if they feel they are being abandoned. Fourth, the Taliban are likely to continue testing Afghan security forces as international support draws down.

How have the recent developments affected the Taliban's overall strategy?

It is easy to forget that the Taliban suffered a major propaganda defeat during the first round of the election. They had waged an intensive and damaging campaign in the weeks before the election, including a terrible massacre in the restaurant of Kabul's Serena hotel, where they killed, among others, an international election observer and a well-respected Afghan journalist, his wife, and young children. Afghans were outraged at this attack. Many Afghan voters told journalists that they had voted not only in defiance of Taliban threats, but against the Taliban ideology.

Did the electoral dispute have any effect on support for the Taliban?

The positive effect of this moment of political clarity regarding Afghanistan's democratic future was quickly lost, however, in the dispute between Afghan political elites after the second round vote. The squabbling between the Ghani and Abdullah camps over the second round, the mutual accusations of electoral fraud, and the eventual need for the international community - the US in particular - to resolve their dispute, resulted in a loss of credibility for the elites contesting the election.

The Taliban pointed to all of these factors - especially the involvement of the US in brokering the power-sharing agreement between Ghani and Abdullah - to discredit the election and reiterate the theme of foreign occupation, which has been a consistently effective propaganda point for them.

An election that led to a clear victory of a single candidate, legitimized by a large turnout, might have forced the Taliban to recalibrate their strategy. Given the perception that the power-sharing government is weak and divided, the fact that international support is being reduced, and the announcement by the Obama administration to withdraw all combat troops by 2016, the most likely strategy by the Taliban is likely to be one of testing the government rather than seeking a negotiated deal.

Do you see any way to change the situation?

The only factor that is likely to change this is if there is a significant revision of Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan, resulting in Pakistani pressure on the Taliban to seek a political agreement with the Afghan government rather than further instability. There is some evidence that Pakistan is rethinking its policy, and that an increasingly nervous China is encouraging this process, but for now it does not seem to be happening quickly enough to avert planning for renewed Taliban fighting next spring.

In this context, what is the new Afghan government's position on reconciliation with the insurgents?

During his electoral campaign, Ghani emphasized the need for peace in Afghanistan and reconciliation with the insurgency. His rhetoric, however, was more focused on the need for the Taliban to reconcile with the government under the current constitution, rather than on a political negotiation that would involve a serious reconsideration of Afghanistan's political order, which is what the Taliban seek.

There have been a number of early interactions between Ghani's administration and Pakistan, including a visit by Ghani last week to Islamabad. It is likely that Ghani's talking points will focus on how Pakistan can contribute to Afghanistan's stability, but this will be a long process involving vital Pakistani national security claims.

It must also be kept in mind that the reconciliation issue is not Ghani's alone to decide. He needs the support of his power-sharing partner, Abdullah, who leads a political faction that has significant and understandable historical grievances about the Taliban.

How would you describe President Ghani's performance during his first weeks in office?

There are very good reasons for optimism under President Ghani, who has spent his first two months acting decisively on a clear reform agenda. One of his first acts was to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States, which president Karzai had refused to sign. The BSA not only ensures that US and NATO troops can remain in Afghanistan, signing it removed a significant thorn in the US-Afghanistan relationship.

Ghani then reopened the investigation of the Kabul Bank scandal. In 2010, Kabul Bank collapsed, losing nearly one billion USD, when it was revealed that the bank had acted more like a Ponzi scheme than a bank. The collapse of the bank cost the Karzai government a huge amount of donor confidence. By reopening this issue, Ghani signaled a desire to advance a reformist agenda and regain the confidence of donors.

More generally, president Karzai has been such a decisive influence over the past decade, that many in Afghanistan and in the international community - think that his patronage-based form of governing is the only way that Afghanistan can be governed. It seems president Ghani is out to prove that this is not the case, and that a more modern, rules-based form of government can work in Afghanistan.

What are some of the major obstacles for the new president?

The problem is that Ghani, while being decisive and reform-oriented, is so far acting alone. He has failed to agree on a cabinet with Abdullah - though it is expected that they will have to name key ministers before a London meeting of donors in early December.

In the short term, this has allowed Ghani to act with a great deal of flexibility and decisiveness, unencumbered by cabinet politics, and especially the politics that come with having a power-sharing cabinet. But ultimately he will have to face this issue, and the dilemmas it poses.

As they negotiate over appointments, the major dilemma for both Ghani and Abdullah is to find a balance between appointing the competent ministers that Afghanistan needs to implement needed reforms, and placating the powerful figures who backed each of the candidates. If too many power-brokers are alienated, they could become spoilers and undermine the state; if too many of them are accommodated, it will be impossible to implement real reforms.

The power-sharing agreement rescued the country from possible civil unrest, but might only have institutionalized the rivalry between the Ghani and Abdullah camps. Despite the fact that both of them campaigned on reformist platforms, it is perhaps more difficult for both of them to agree on a reform agenda than it would have been had either won outright.

Scott Smith is the director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia program at the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace (USIP).